Russia‘s foreign policies have been characterized by the multipolar world, pivoting to China, releasing Russia from an Eurocentric foreign policy and building a liberal empire for more than a ten-year period. Contrary to the beliefs of many observers these grand geopolitical scenario’s did not begin in the 2010s. Each of these geopolitical ideas was already in preparation well before the 2000s. They were the result of the collapse of Soviet order, the chaos that followed, the rise and dominance of China, as well as a resentment within the Russian political class towards the Western world order.
Let’s begin with multipolarism. The Russian political elite often cites it as a solution for the problems that have arisen since the end Cold War, when the US has dominated the oceans and the outer edge of the Eurasian landmass. The Russian world in the 1990s was shattered and engulfed in turmoil. Moscow’s geopolitical power in Eurasia decreased as did its borders. NATO/EU and the US began to expand their military, technological, and economic power across Eastern Europe and gradually moved into Ukraine and South Caucasus.
In many ways, Russia’s first foreign policies initiatives of a world multipolar, in which multiple powers act simultaneously as global leaders, evolved as a reaction to the challenges Russia was facing at the time.
Evgeny Primenko, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Boris Yeltsin years, played a key role in the development of the concept of a multipolar world. Primakov’s response to Russia’s inability of holding off the West‘s influence was to seek out powers that could balance the West. The phrase “strategic triangular” was coined to describe the three countries of Russia, China and India. The triangle did not have a formal agreement to coordinate their respective strategic views regarding Eurasia, or anything else. However, its creation was an indication of a coalescence based on different, mainly angry, views towards the West-led global order. It was only a question of time (perhaps decades) before Moscow pressed for deeper cooperation with Asian states in order to challenge the US.
This is the context of Moscow’s response in response to tensions between the West and the West. Moscow has once again turned its gaze east, partly out necessity and partially out of inevitability. Putin’s pivot towards China is essentially a continuation of what was done in the 1990s.
The pivot to Asia is closely tied to another myth of recent Russian diplomatic history: Moscow’s efforts to shed its Eurocentric approach to international affairs. This has also been attributed by some to Putin. However, this has been developing since the 1990s when the Russian political class began to show signs of resentment towards wealthy and successful westerners.
Even further back, Russian attempts to “deeuropeanize” their policy can be seen. The Soviets with their ideologies and worldviews tried it, as did the Romanovs, especially after the Crimean War in 1853-1856. But the Romanovs lacked the resources and Asian countries to partner with. Moscow’s current “de-Europeanization of foreign policy” should be seen as a return to a grand historical cycle in Russian thought.
All these foreign policies, whether old or new (as some believe), are dependent on the way Russia wants position itself in Eurasia. The decision to create a territorial empire is not yet clear, but it’s evident that the Russian elite hasn’t given up on the idea either. From the late 2000s to the early 2010s, there was a growing push within Russian foreign policy to build an empire of economics that would ideally not involve military occupation.
The Eurasian Economic Union was created in 2015, but the idea behind it dates back to the 1990s. Russian political elites, angry about their poor standing vis-à-vis the west and afraid of losing neighboring states to NATO/the EU discussed ways to reassemble a lost empire. The only way to build a liberal order (i.e. non-military), but one that was still strongly connected to the Russian heartland in the former Soviet space could be through economic means. This would include buying up railways and pipelines in Ukraine, South Caucasus and Central Asia and becoming their primary trade partner.
In a sense, the EEU is a result of these discussions, a seemingly perfect middle ground between a military solution, and a complete abandonment of empire. Moscow’s liberal empire, while looser than the Soviet Union, would still be tightly controlled. Moscow would not let neighboring countries decide for themselves which military or economic block to choose. Russia is pursuing a concept of ‘limited sovereignty’ for its neighbors.
Many still believe that Russia’s foreign policies have changed fundamentally under the current leadership. However, there are many indications that the “multipolarism”, pivoting to Asia, building a liberal empire and the end of Russia’s Eurocentric policy can be traced at least back to the 1990s. Putin was the facilitator of geopolitical changes that had been developing for decades.
Emil Avdaliani: Analysis
Emil Avdaliani, a professor of European University, is also the Director of Middle East Studies for Geocase.
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