Donald Trump should be happy. He is not only on his way to the White House but could also return as one of America’s most powerful presidents for decades. The Supreme Court has aligned with his vision, and the Republican Party was reshaped in a loyalty-based manner. Both the Senate and the House (probably) are red. He even won that once-elusive popular vote.
Trump’s wildest dreams are not hindered by the fact that he is constitutionally prohibited from running for office again. It is important to have a “strong vertical”, the ability to take quick decisions and put them into action.
Consider how U.S. President Joe Biden‘s administration struggled to push the Ukraine aid bill through a Republican-controlled House. This challenge would likely have been worse under Kamala, who would have had to deal with Ukraine support being politicized and held hostage by an opposing Senate and/or House in order to extract politically painful compromises.
Unfortunately, the good news for Ukraine is likely to end there. Trump and his proxies are a mixture of skepticism, hostility and resentment toward the continuation of aid to Ukraine. Elon Musk has shifted his social media rhetoric from one of support for Ukraine to one of anti-Ukraine rhetoric. U.S. Vice-President-elect J.D. Vance has stated publicly that Taiwan is more important to the U.S.
Fortunately, Trump’s public statements do not accurately reflect his policy plans. Information about his private views and conversations, including those with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, provide a little more insight, but not much.
Trump wants Russia neutral in a possible U.S. China conflict. This will allow him to push for territorial and politic concessions from Ukraine. He would like Ukraine not to win or lose. Some reports suggest that the U.S. military will continue to support Ukraine or even increase it, even if just to boost its defense industry’s capacity in the Pacific.
Trump wants Russia to remain neutral in a possible U.S. China conflict and to ensure that he can push for territorial and politic concessions from Ukraine.
The problem is that Russia has the upper-hand and would reject any deal which leaves a viable Ukraine. The U.S. lacks the tools to effectively pressurize Russia, and China will likely increase its support for Moscow in order to keep it within its orbit.
This does not look good for Kyiv. A bad peace agreement could lead to elections and chaos in the country as blame is shifted. It could also lead to mass male emigration. Russia would most likely attack again if the West was distracted by crises and Ukraine is weak.
Trump’s first month: domestic challenges and distractors
Fortunately for Ukraine’s sake, it is unlikely to be a priority for Trump. His focus will be divided between numerous domestic issues upon entering office, starting with his legal battles. Trump faces four high-stakes legal cases, which are likely to be postponed or dismissed but still require time and attention.
There’s also the U.S. Debt Ceiling. The U.S. debt servicing costs reached a record of $1.2 trillion during the fiscal year that ended in October 2024, which is more than military expenditures. The current suspension of the debt ceiling expires Jan. 2, 2025. This is just before a new Congress takes office on Jan. 3, and Trump’s inauguration, which occurs on Jan. 20, 2025.
This is more than a headache about starting the presidency in a state of government shutdown. Trump’s tax cuts and spending pledges will increase the national debt, which is a concern for Silicon Valley supporters. They will also fuel inflation. Many of his supporters voted for him because they were concerned about rising living costs. This led to difficult trade-offs, especially with tariffs that are inherently inflationary.
Ironically, Trump might try to control energy costs, either by releasing Saudi Arabia’s reserves or by pressing them to do so. This could impact Russia more than any support for Ukraine.
Immigration, abortion restrictions, and reshaping of political institutions (the infamous “Project 2025”) are all domestic issues. The “Trump Wall”, which was implemented in 2016, may be a model for mass deportations. It will take years to implement, and it will ultimately prove to be largely symbolic. Although he may seem all-powerful in writing, the radical wing, including the Freedom Caucus and other members of his party, hold blocking power that he will have to manage.
Trump will likely delegate Ukraine’s affairs to an envoy, either because of domestic demands or the realization that it won’t be easy. This role could be filled by the ex-Acting Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell, who was also Trump’s envoy for Serbia-Kosovo from 2019-2021. Other possible candidates include Robert O’Brien (ex-National Security Advisor), or Mike Pompeo, ex-CIA chief and ex-Secretary at State.
Ukraine’s future under Trump
Ukraine’s position in negotiations is weakening and worsening. This would have an impact on the terms of a potential deal. The current Russian offensive, which has seen the largest weekly territorial gains this year, appears to be timed so that Moscow can strengthen its position before Trump’s inaugural.
Kyiv will likely engage Trump’s envoy to try and show Ukraine as an exciting business opportunity, that it shows strength to support Ukraine, and that under the right circumstances, they can win (as Zelensky suggested in his recent statement on “peace through power”). It will be important to engage Trump’s supporters, including evangelicals, and isolationists. Russia, with its better ground game in Washington will lobby both and leverage, or even create crises, involving the Ukrainian Orthodox church of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Kyiv will likely engage with Trump’s representative and try to show Ukraine to be a promising business chance, that supporting it shows strength, and they can deliver under the right circumstances.
Kyiv is realistic and believes that this could mean “delivering deals” to Trump’s inner circle. Zelensky, among others, has highlighted Ukraine’s potential for lithium, titanium gold, uranium and gas production.
Ukraine will probably try to maintain control of the peace process, by pushing for a 2nd peace summit. This could be held around the 3 year anniversary of the full scale invasion. It is not clear if this will work.
The most likely scenario is that the U.S. will disengage in part, leaving Europe to fill in the gaps. This could take three broad directions.
Europe takes the lead when U.S. support stagnates. Trump may try to negotiate a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia, but Russia might reject any terms that allow a viable Ukraine by demanding more territory or internal reforms. Trump may withdraw his support, recognizing that there is no clear winner.
Europe would need to increase its support and could deploy boots on the ground, either for training or, later, for combat. Despite being politically difficult, some Nordic countries could lead the way. Poland and Czechia may also join them. This support could keep Ukraine fighting till late 2025. By then, Russia’s resources will have depleted and it may be forced to accept terms that make Ukraine viable.
A forced ceasefire by early 2025. Trump could bring Russia to a table and offer terms that Ukraine would accept, such freezing the conflict on the front lines, and offering security assurances short of NATO. This arrangement could include elements similar to South Korea‘s security arrangement.
A ceasefire could lead to Ukrainian elections, and depending on the terms of the ceasefire and the promised reconstruction funds either stability or chaos. A mass exodus would be likely as well.
This scenario faces a major challenge: Russia will not accept terms that make Ukraine viable and capable of rebuilding. Moscow would accept these terms only if they led to Western disengagement, and chaos within Ukraine — creating an opportunity to attack again once Ukraine demobilizes.
Ukrainian collapse: If Trump completely disengages and Europe cannot compensate for the loss of Ukraine, it faces an economic and military collapse. Manpower shortages and ongoing attrition combined with limited financial resources can create a vicious circle.
This scenario is not impossible. The unpredictable nature of Trump’s presidency opens the possibility of significant more support for Ukraine. The harsh reality is that this is unlikely and both Ukraine as well as Europe need strong contingency planning.
Editor’s note: The opinions expressed by the authors in the op/ed section do not necessarily reflect those of the Kyiv Independent.
Read More @ kyivindependent.com