I am currently in communication with all of our brigades on this front. Our aerial reconnaissance has detected between 250 and 500 enemy infantrymen at the front line and in the immediate rear over the course of a day. This front spans up to 18 km. Some of the enemy forces are advancing, some are retreating, and some are establishing positions. This means that the enemy is not deploying large tank columns or launching full-scale attacks with battalions. Their numerical advantage is not significantly greater than ours.
The enemy’s tactic involves small reconnaissance groups of 3-6 people, controlled by drones, moving along multiple directions and targeting our positions with drones and artillery. While the Russians are suffering significant losses, they are still managing to infiltrate between our combat positions. Sometimes our forces are able to neutralize several assault groups and hold their ground, but other times our forces are forced to retreat due to command issues. This allows the enemy to quickly occupy empty positions. This is because the Russians have multiple echelons of combat orders in their offensive strategy, with immediate consequences for those who refuse to attack. On the other hand, we have single-echelon combat orders, making each of our strongholds vulnerable.
To stop the enemy through attrition, we need to establish a defensive line and stop engaging in frontal battles in unfortified positions. In order to make this attrition costly for the enemy and cause their losses to be 5-10 times greater, we need a well-organized and planned defense. This includes decentralized actions, effective interaction between troops, maximum use of drones and electronic warfare (EW), fortified positions, cleared sectors for fire and damage, and most importantly, our own capable infantry. Our infantry should not withdraw because they believe they are invincible, but because they are well-trained, well-managed, trust their commanders, and have replacements for rotation and support.
In order to effectively use drones and EW, they need to be subordinated to a single center. This type of interaction must be established and our EW must stop interfering with our own drones. We need to deploy hundreds of Mavics and Autels to each brigade immediately to halt the enemy by increasing the number of drops. However, the supplies we are receiving from the state are minimal and only cover less than 10% of our needs.
Since the command of the Joint Task Force is unable to adequately organize and manage operations at the operational and tactical levels, someone must take on some of these functions. This has been successfully done by the 58th Motorized Infantry Brigade on another front. At least one capable brigade needs to be deployed on the outskirts of Pokrovsk. Given the enemy’s advancement of about 500 meters a day, we have approximately one week to deploy this brigade. This brigade must have an organized and effective staff that is capable of establishing interaction on the ground between all attached units, drones and EW, reconnaissance and strike assets.
It is important to note that Pokrovsk is home to Ukraine’s only mine producing coking coal, even now. If we do not take action, this valuable resource could fall into enemy hands. Therefore, it is crucial that we act quickly and effectively to defend this area.
In summary, we need to establish a defensive line, stop engaging in frontal battles, and use well-organized and planned defense tactics to make attrition costly for the enemy. We also need to effectively use drones and EW, deploy additional resources, and have a capable brigade deployed in Pokrovsk. This is a critical situation and we must act swiftly and efficiently to protect our territory and resources.
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