Israel is still asking tough questions one year after the deadly 7 October Hamas attack, when its powerful army was caught by surprise and quickly overwhelmed.
BBC heard family members describe what happened on a military base guarding the border with Gaza.
On the morning of October 7, more than 60 Israeli soldiers were reported to have died, while others were taken hostage.
Israel’s military has not yet published its official investigation into what happened that day. However, it has briefed the relatives of those who died there and some have shared these details with the BBC.
This is the closest thing we have to a military official’s account of what happened that day.
We have spoken to survivors and seen messages from the dead. We have also listened to voice recordings that reported the attack as it occurred, which has helped us build a picture about the speed and ferocity.
The BBC has found
* Many soldiers, not only the young women who were responsible for monitoring border cameras, noticed suspicious activity at the base prior to 7 October.
* Soldiers observed a sudden stop in Hamas activity before the attack
* Many Israeli soldiers were not armed, and the official protocol had soldiers standing back instead of advancing when under attack.
* Some surveillance equipment could be easily destroyed by Hamas or was out of order.
The details we have established raises questions, including why so few soldiers at a border base were armed, why more wasn’t being done to respond to intelligence and warnings received, why it took so long to get reinforcements, and if the infrastructure of the base left those on the base unprotected.
We presented our findings to IDF who responded by saying that it was undergoing a “thorough inquiry into the events of the 7th of October, including those in Nahal Oz and the circumstances prior”.
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Sharon, not her real name, began her shift on 7 October at Nahal Oz at 4:00 am. This is about a kilometer from the Gaza border fence.
She was a member of the base’s women-only military unit, known as Tatzpitaniyot (in Hebrew), and her role was to examine live surveillance footage captured on cameras along the fence.
The women watched Gaza on a bank monitors, in the war room of the base, or Hamal. They worked in shifts.
The Hamal is an unwindowed room with a solid door, blast walls and strict security protocols.
Families of those who were on base that day have been told by the IDF that many military personnel were unarmed.
Gen Israel Ziv (former head of IDF’s Operations Division) told the BBC that there would have never been unarmed soldiers on the border during his time.
“It’s not logical… The soldier is all about the weapon,” says he.
A unit of infantry soldiers belonging to the IDF Golani brigade was part of the armed staff at Nahal Oz on that day.
The BBC reported previously that the Tatzpitaniyot noticed an increase in suspicious activity on other side of fence. We have now established that other soldiers from different units at the base shared these concerns.
However, the atmosphere was quiet in the days leading up to 7 October.
One infantry soldier at the base recalled, “There was nothing that scared us.” Everyone felt that something was odd. It didn’t make any sense.”
Gen Ziv says that the IDF’s inability to understand what was happening stemmed from “a lot” of arrogance, the belief that “Hamas would not attack, wouldn’t dare and even if they did, they were not capable”.
“We went to bed on the 6th, thinking there was a cat there. We woke up on 7th and it’s a Tiger.”
At 05.30, Golani members prepared to start a jeep-patrol along the Israeli side. They did this every morning before dawn. Three of the Golani soldiers told the BBC that their superiors ordered them to stand back and delay the patrol because of the threat of anti-tank rockets.
“There was an alert.” One recalls that it was forbidden to climb the path next to the fence.
Shimon Malka (21 years old) said that such a warning is not uncommon, but it was still unusual. They gave it little consideration.
Gen Ziv said that it is standard IDF procedure to stand people back when suspected attacks like these occur so they “can avoid being exposed as targets”. He says that “Hamas” realised this and took advantage of it.
He said that the base should have been equipped to allow the Golani to respond safely from positions.
“There are simple techniques that can be used to cover soldiers, so they remain undercover but still able to react and not lose sight,” said he.
Sharon noticed Hamas fighters moving as the Golani waited far from the fence. But they appeared to be nothing more than routine. “They also have shifts.”
By 06:20, Hamas began firing rockets. Sharon said that this did not seem alarming at all – she’d experienced rocket attacks in the past and her base was well shielded against them.
“It usually takes five minutes to shoot and then a short break,” she says.
This time, however, there was no pause.
Sharon claims that she could see Hamas forces closing in at around 06:30.
The Tatzpitaniyot radioed the ground forces in order to alert them.
One of the young women, whose voice was slightly shaking, announced: “All stations, there are four people running up to the fence. Copy.” “I am identifying the two armed people who are running to the fence. Copy.”
Shimon also heard code words for an upcoming rocket attack on his radio. His commander told them to jump out of their jeep and into a Namer, a type Israeli armoured personnel carriers. They were then ordered to head towards the fence.
He could not see any incursions, so he assumed it was a drill.
The IDF and the people of Israel had long regarded this so-called iron barrier as impenetrable. Yet, bases along its length began reporting breaches.
Sharon says that each Tatzpitaniyot at Nahal Oz on a shift saw between two and five breaches in the section of the border fence they were responsible to monitor. They watched as Hamas fighters fought their way into Israel.
Gen Ziv said that the ease in which fighters crossed the fence revealed the flaws of a barrier that was perceived as impenetrable.
“As you can see, two truckloads of people could push it. It was nothing. Hamas would have been delayed for a few more hours if there had been a minefield 50 or 60 metres away.
According to IDF family briefings shared with the BBC, a rocket struck and damaged an observation post in Nahal Oz shortly before 06:40.
IDF informed families that a sniper-sighting device was in place at the Hamal, the nerve centre of base. An officer tried to shoot remotely on gunmen who were trying to cross the border.
Infantry officers also joined the Tatzpitaniyot at Hamal. Sharon recalls a commander who arrived in her pajamas.
The monitors in the Hamal went dark as the gunmen continued to fire at the surveillance cameras.
Gen Ziv says that the fact that Hamas was operating in plain view of these surveillance cameras along the border for weeks prior to the attack was a tactical move in order to “normalise” things.
Rafi Ben-Shitrit, Alroy’s father, told the BBC that his son was woken up by rockets and sirens just 100 metres away from where the Tatzpitaniyot workers were.
Alroy’s family received details of the initial investigation by the IDF about what happened on that day.
The balloon at Nahal Oz was supposed to operate 24 hours a days and provide a better view of Gaza.
On 7 October, it was only one of three border posts that were not working.
Mr Ben Shitrit says, “The balloon at Nahal Oz did not work and nobody was stressed. They were told that it would be fixed by Sunday.”
“There was a feeling that Hamas is deterred and if anything happens, it will be a terrorist infiltration at best or a terrorist squad at worst.”
Sharon continued to communicate with soldiers on the terrain from her surveillance post.
“I cried simultaneously and announced,” she says.
She recalls that the commanding officers yelled “quiet”, because some of the women were losing their focus in the horror.
Shimon claims he followed radio directions at the fence. He couldn’t figure out why the young woman he heard sounded so terrified.
“I could feel stress but I couldn’t even see anything.”
When his unit arrived at the location the Tatzpitaniyot directed them to, Hamas trucks were breaking through the fence.
They started shooting at us. “Maybe five trucks.”
The soldiers fired back and ran over the motorbike riders.
The moment that everyone feared and no one could imagine arrived shortly after 07:00. Hamas gunmen stood at the Hamal’s door.
Sharon recalled being told to “get up, the terrorists at the door”
The Tatzpitaniyot was ordered to leave their positions and proceed to a war room office.
Gen Ziv claims that the military’s higher-ups did not place enough emphasis on the defense of the bases, instead focusing on external patrols.
“That was a part of the whole mess, because once the enemy shocked them and went into their base, they were not prepared. He says that the whole thing collapsed.
Around 07:20, a bomb shelter known as the shield was attacked outside the Hamal.
According to a WhatsApp message received by the BBC at 07:38 from one of the Tatzpitaniyot who were sheltering there, “four female fighters” were protecting them.
She did not send any further messages to the group.
The IDF told the families that the “female fighters” were the only people armed in the shelter. They kept Hamas fighters away with their gunfire, until a grenade blast killed one of the commanders inside and injured others.
Around 10 soldiers escaped the shelter at this point and locked themselves into the barracks. Hamas either killed or captured everyone else in the shield.
Shimon and his commanding officer returned to the base but were unaware of the magnitude of what had happened.
The IDF told the family of a victim of the Nahal Oz attack that the base had been attacked by 70 fighters in four directions and that more would join as the day progressed.
Thousands of people crossed the border into Israel from all sides of the Gaza Strip.
Shimon said that on his way back to the base he began to understand the scale of the attack.
“When we arrived at the base, it was all ablaze,” he said.
Sharon claims that the group of 20 soldiers who were in the Hamal tried to calm down each other.
They also repeatedly tried to get more support.
“I think [someone] said that there’s no backup and no-one could come. And I remember my officer saying ‘We don‘t need backup, but we need rescue.
According to the IDF, a Zik drone arrived shortly before 08:00. However, it had trouble distinguishing between Israeli soldiers, and Hamas. This meant that it was slower in attacking its intended targets.
Around the same time, a large number of shots were fired at the Hamal. The armed men fought at the door of the building in order to prevent Hamas getting inside. The fighting lasted for four hours.
Shimon claims that he and the other soldiers at the base are completely outnumbered. No sign of reinforcements was seen.
“It was all very vague.”
Around 09:00 the Golani went to the dining room of the base where the Tatzpitaniyot told them that most of the gunmen had been hidden.
The IDF would later tell relatives that there were 150 armed men for every 25 combatants entering Nahal Oz on that day.
Gen Ziv says that “what Hamas did in the morning was swarming.”
“There were more than 70 different breaches… Over 3,000 terrorists…They knew they didn’t possess the quality, so they went for quantity.”
Israeli media reported that a video was filmed around the same time and shows young surveillance officers who were captured by armed Hamas at Nahal Oz.
“You dogs, you will be stepped on,” a man is heard saying, as the women’s faces are pressed against the wall, with their hands tied.
Naama Levy (19 years old), who had just arrived at the base yesterday, pleads with her blood-stained face that she has “friends” in Palestine.
The video shows the women being dragged in a vehicle and driven off.
Watching Naama’s mother is a traumatic experience. “The blood, the wounds, what she said, what the terrorists told them, the horror at those moments,” says Ayelet.
Gen Ziv said the Tatzpitaniyot in Nahal Oz were “amazing – the mistake, however, was the system and the commanders, not they”.
Officers told the grieving families that at 09:45 am, more than three hours after the attack began, an IDF helicopter began firing on the Hamas gunmen. It fired 12 times into the base.
Shimon, six others, and their commander, drove away from the base and returned on foot in formation. He claims they were shot at “from all angles”.
The sound of automatic gunfire was followed by a series single shots fired by a Hamas shooter that they could not see.
“Every time he fired, one of my close friends got a shot in the head,” says he.
Shimon claims he was the sole survivor of his companions, and he, too, had a close call.
“A bullet passed by my head…I could hear the bullets hitting concrete around me and I felt the heat from them.”
He says that his radio is no longer working at this point.
Gen Ziv describes this day as “a perfect storm”.
He explains, “For so many long hours, the backup was missing because nobody knew what was happening and where to send it.”
Shimon fled the scene, then moved to a position as a sniper before joining soldiers from another unit to protect a Kibbutz.
Around 11:00, a significant event occurred in the Hamal or war room.
The locks on the doors were released because the electricity was cut. According to the IDF report given to several families, the war room was wide open. Hamas fighters started shooting and throwing grenades inside.
The IDF informed families that one soldier was killed in a knife fight with a Golani.
Gen Ziv stated that the military system as a whole had “already failed” at the point where soldiers were relying solely on door locks to ensure their safety.
In the IDF briefing for families, it was stated that “terrorists set fire to the Hamal by throwing a flammable material into it”.
“The smoke was thick. Everyone began to cough and suffocate. Sharon recalls that people began to faint and fall.
One mother claims that the IDF told her that Hamas had used a “toxic material” in the attack. Others were unaware of this detail, or claimed the IDF has since changed its story.
According to those present, at around 12:30, Sharon and seven other people in the Hamal managed to climb out of the toilet window.
She and the other survivors waited there for more survivors to arrive. But no-one came. Sharon was the sole survivor of the Tatzpitaniyot who were on duty that day. One other young woman who was in the unit but not working on that morning also survived.
By the end 7 October, the military regained the control of the area, but many of the soldiers stationed there didn’t survive. Seven Tatzpitaniyot, taken as hostages to Gaza, were killed, one was rescued, and five remain.
Around 1,200 people, including 300 soldiers, were killed in Israel that day. 251 other hostages were also taken. Hamas’ health ministry reports that more than 41,000 Palestinians were killed since then as a result Israeli military action in Gaza.
According to his father, the IDF informed him that the Nahal Oz dead included Alroy the balloonist, and four of his comrades who had fought a long battle with Hamas.
He said that they killed close to ten gunmen. However, the five were outnumbered, and were found dead in a mobile shelter around 14:30.
The war room, which was designed to be a safe place for the base’s unit, was destroyed. The war room, which was designed as a safe space for the base’s units, was destroyed. There were bone fragments found in the ashes.
The families of the victims and survivors are left with many unanswered question about what went wrong.
Additional reporting by Jon Donnison, Naomi Scherbel Ball
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