China’s approach is rarely discussed, despite the fact that the Russia-West rivalry is seen as one of the most important geopolitical issues of our time. China’s imaginary map shows that the western lands, from Xinjiang, to Portugal, and Scandinavia, are where China’s rise will take place. China’s geography, which is jutted deep into the Eurasian continent makes it highly vulnerable to possible instability in Central Asia. Afghanistan and Russia are also at risk. It is often argued, and rightly so, that China’s rapid economic growth is the most important factor in the rapidly changing world order. However, economic progress alone, no matter how grand, cannot reshape it. China, like any other aspiring great power throughout history, would need favorable geopolitical conditions on the Eurasian landmass in order to advance its Eurasia wide interests.
The Russia-West confrontation is one such opportunity. Both Russia and the West are seen by the Chinese as belonging to the same category: those who once sought to establish a colonial existence on China’s land and now see the country‘s success as threatening. The Chinese political culture is firmly rooted in the belief that Russia, the US and other western powers do not like China’s geopolitical growth. China has a vested interest in keeping its Eurasian power blocs as divided as possible. Beijing’s tacit policy reflects the tradition of playing against each other: Sometimes openly supporting Moscow’s confrontation with Western sanctions, or through votes at the United Nations.
This allows China to use Russia as a diversion, since the US is constantly committing time, resources, and military to contain Russia, whether in Africa, the Middle East or the Black Sea and Mediterranean Seas. This Chinese approach creates chaos amongst the group of countries that were historically prone towards dominating China. In this game, Russia plays a minor role in China’s Eurasian Geopolitical Calculus. Its influence growth under Putin is not nearly as significant as China’s. Beijing has reservations about a possible Russia/China-led Eurasia. The geopolitical weights are different between the two countries, and this prevents an equal distribution of influence. China will remain close to Russia so long as it helps Beijing distract the West from the Indo-Pacific.
In light of Russia’s Middle East policies, the confrontation between Russia and the West is also beneficial for China. Beijing is economically dependent on the region, but it’s been dominated for centuries by Western powers. In the last decade, Western influence has decreased in the region, while Russia’s actions have further disrupted America’s position. China could, in the long term, play a more active part in the resource-rich area, due to the geography of the region as one of the connections with European markets within the BRI.
The map of China reveals the geopolitical imperatives of the country throughout its history. The first goal of successive Chinese dynasties, and then of the communist government, was to maintain control of the heartland or Han core. This area is abundant in productive lands and is populated with people. The next logical step would be to exert influence over the zones that surround the Han core, which include mountainous regions in the west, deserts in the north-west and impregnable forest in the south.
The third imperative is to protect China’s coastline against foreign powers. During the medieval period, there were intermittent military naval incursions in the Indian Ocean and attempts to dominate Japan or other nearby islands. One could argue that the Chinese saw no need to develop strong naval capabilities because they did not perceive any external threats from the sea.
Geographic barriers and external threats, almost exclusively coming from the nomads of the north, limited China’s political and economic contacts with the outside and conditioned its nearly autocratic economy. China’s isolation was a major geopolitical asset. It was a source of security during the ancient and middle ages. In the 20th century, this was not the case. With globalization, international commerce, and the multiplicity of supply chain, China had to be more open and rely on raw materials from overseas via sea routes. China’s fourth imperative is to secure international trade routes and diversify resource bases. This can only be achieved by establishing alternative land routes such as the BRI or building a strong military fleet capable to protect supply chains throughout the Indo-Pacific. Modern China is a much stronger competitor for America than the Soviet Union. This highlights the need to look past the Cold War era. This is a limited framework that does not cover all aspects of the current competition between Washington, D.C. and China.
Emil Avdaliani, a professor of European University, is the Director of Middle East Studies for the Georgian think tank Geocase.
Emil Avdaliani: Analysis
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