NATO is ill-prepared, despite its size and potential for a long-term contract with Russia. Its ammunition stores are empty and it has political divisions.
Soldiers carry NATO flags and flags of Poland‘s Republic during a military procession on Polish Armed Forces Day, August 15, 2024 in Warsaw. (Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
The launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine in February 2022 presented the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with a new reality.
The alliance, which had been deemed “braindead’ by French President Emmanuel Macron just a few short years ago, awoke to a threat that was thought to be a thing of the past: a full conventional land war in Europe.
Military officials have warned of a resurgent Russian menace to NATO and said that allies should be ready within three, five or eight years.
“The Russian Federation is a problem to the world order and democracy. In reality, it’s a war between Russia and the democratic world. It’s not (just) about Ukraine,” Romanian Defense chief Gheorghita Vlad stated in February this year.
NATO’s preparedness for such a conflict is in doubt. After decades of fighting insurgents instead of armies, underfunded European troops still adjusting to the “peace dividend” years of the post-Cold War, and the shadow cast by Donald Trump’s return, NATO’s ability to prepare for such a confrontation is in question.
“NATO cannot defeat Russia with its current capabilities, without incurring significant costs in terms of casualties and damage, as well as temporary loss of sovereignty,” Gordon B. Davis told the Kyiv Independent. Davis is a senior fellow of the CEPA think-tank and NATO’s ex-deputy assistant secretary general.
The 32 NATO members can collectively field a powerful and modern fighting force. However, its European contingent faces ammunition shortages and a fragmented defence industry.
There is also the question of Western societies’ willingness to sacrifice in a costly, long-lasting war.
NATO’s capabilities
NATO is still a powerful force despite its long-term decline.
Even the European part can outgun Russian forces in many aspects. They have a greater number of active duty personnel and advanced long-range missiles like Storm Shadow/SCALP or Taurus, as well as a more powerful, modern air force.
According to the Center of Strategic and International Studies, Russia is estimated to have 1.1 million active troops and 1,370 aircraft as of 2024.
NATO has also grown stronger with the addition of two new members – Sweden and Finland – adding two well-trained, interoperable militaries and a border that is more than 1,300 kilometers long for Russia to defend.
Ed Arnold, senior research fellow at RUSI (the Royal United Services Institute), commented in the Kyiv Independent that NATO still has a powerful ability to kill and destroy with long-range fire.
“If they (Russians) fought like they do now in Ukraine against a NATO force they would be destroyed fairly quickly,” he said, referring to Russia’s high-mortality “meat grinder Storm Z tactics.”
Davis acknowledges that NATO would win the battle but not without losses.
“Assuming only a conventional battle, NATO would defeat Russia’s air and naval forces, even though its bombers and drones would be successful in striking NATO forces and territory,” he said. He added that the alliance would “defeat Russian ground forces but not necessarily prevent Russians from taking territory.”
NATO planners have identified the Baltic States as the most vulnerable to an attack. They are located next to Russia, Belarus, and Kaliningrad, a heavily militarized Russian enclave.
In the event of war between NATO and Russia the Russian and Belarusian troops would link up across the 40 kilometer wide Suwalki Gap, cutting off the only land route for all three Baltic States.
Shock and awe vs. long haul
NATO could win a quick “shock and awe” conflict where their superior firepower would quickly devastate Russian forces. The question is, would this be a war of that type?
The Kremlin knows its strengths and weaknesses in comparison with its main geopolitical rival. The Russian state and society, as demonstrated in the first year of a full-scale invasion, were prepared to absorb initial losses and rebuild for a long battle.
Arnold said that the majority of NATO forces’ combat experience comes from Afghanistan. This is very, very distinct from what could happen in a possible war between NATO and Russia.
In the 20 years of Afghanistan War, approximately 3,600 coalition soldiers were killed. Around 200,000 Russian troops were estimated to have died in Ukraine in the past two and a half years.
Western societies will be more sensitive to casualties and their factories and armies have shown to be unprepared for a sustained support to Ukraine.
Last month, insiders told The Kyiv Independent that empty Pentagon shelves are a major reason for the slow pace of U.S. aid. The EU had to delay its promised 1,000,000 shells to Ukraine because of the “lamentable condition of the defense industry.”
If you prefer, you can use “salami tactics” — a series small military actions over one large one — to test the unity and courage of allies.
Instead of marching to Berlin and Paris, Russia could grab and hold a piece of the Baltics to ward off any possible counterattack by threatening a massive — and even nuclear — escalation.
The Kremlin does not hesitate to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Recent changes to its doctrine have lowered the threshold of a nuclear response, in an apparent gesture aimed at Western countries.
NATO catching up
In a written commentary for the Kyiv independent, Davis provided a list of NATO’s major weak spots. “Integrated air and missile defence, persistent surveillance, long-to-short range strike systems (including UAVs), land-based electronics warfare, ground munitions inventory (e.g. artillery and mortars, antitank), as well as anti-submarine war capabilities.”
“NATO’s capabilities are excellent, but they are not sufficient in terms of numbers, breadth and depth, or defense production capabilities.”
The peace dividend Europe received in the post-Cold War era was a major factor behind these deficiencies. Believing the threat of a full-blown war with Moscow had passed, European nations reduced average defense funding between 1990 and 2000 from 2,4% to 1,6% of GDP.
In the two decades following 1990, 24 countries stopped conscription. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which is a think tank, says that while (West) Germany (and Italy), France, the U.K., and Italy could field 215, 135 106, 94, and 96 battalions respectively in 1990, by 2020 these numbers had shrunk to 33, 48, 44, 50, and 46. The U.S. also reduced its presence.
In 2014, the alliance began to slowly wake up to the new realities that emerged in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine, its occupation of Crimea, and the war in Donbas.
In an interview with The Kyiv Independent, retired U.S. General Philip M. Breedlove (SACEUR in 2013-16) said: “The good news (is) that since 2014, starting from the Wales conference and each summit thereafter, we’ve truly increased the NATO readiness.”
Breedlove replied: “We’re not ready today to face Russia, but we are much more prepared than we were back in 2014.
The Wales Summit saw the creation of the Readiness Action Plan, which aims to strengthen collective defense and deterrence. Two years later, NATO launched its Enhanced Forward Presence. Initially, four, then eight allied battalions were deployed along the eastern flank of the alliance.
By 2022, SACEUR would command 40,000 troops in Europe, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. This is in addition to the tens of thousand troops of the host countries and the 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe.
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, preparations accelerated. The NATO Force Model was adopted by allies at the Madrid summit of 2022. It is a three-tiered defense plan that will have 300,000 troops prepared within a month and half a mil in a half year.
This is in addition to increased air and naval readiness and exercises such as this years’ Steadfast Defender which, with 90 000 troops, was NATO’s largest drill since the Cold War.
Fresh funds began flowing into defense. In 2014, only three of the allies reached the 2% threshold. Ten years later, the number has grown to 19, including the newcomer, Sweden. Some members have even called for a higher benchmark.
CSIS’s analysis shows that since the beginning of the Russian war in Ukraine 10 years ago the European allies increased their defense expenditures by about a third, to a total $380 billion. Comparatively, Russia’s defence expenditures for the year were approximately $110 billion. A large portion of this was allocated to the war in Ukraine.
Despite looking impressive on paper, many plans are not easily implemented. The efforts to have 300.000 troops on standby for a month are complicated by disputes among national and NATO authorities and low enlistment rates in member countries. IISS analysts noted that only a handful of European militaries have grown in size over the past decade.
The Kyiv Independent reported earlier this year, that despite new investments in the defense industry, it could still take up to two more years for artillery shell production to reach the desired level.
Arnold pointed out that the long-range missiles mentioned, such as Storm Shadow and Taurus, were not even in production at this time, with the former being used in Ukraine.
Uncertain politics in the shadow of Trump
The execution of these ambitious plans depends on the unity and willingness of each member, which could very well be NATO’s Achilles heel.
The possibility of Donald Trump returning to the White House has increased concerns in European capitals. The former president said that he would encourage Russia “to do whatever the hell it wants” towards those members who did not meet the benchmark for defense spending.
Hungary has repeatedly broken the consensus of the allies on the other side. A recent official implied that Budapest wouldn’t resist a Russian invasion. In Slovakia, France and Germany, as well as the Netherlands and other countries, populist and radical political movements are on the rise.
Fatigue is also increasing across the alliance despite the fact that the current sacrifices are mostly small fractions of budgets or retired military equipment.
Arnold emphasized the differences between the countries in NATO’s east and north on the one hand, and the western part of the alliance on the other.
The outcome of the Russian war in Ukraine is also a great unknown. Russian forces are fully engaged in the war and have suffered heavy losses. The war’s outcome will determine their ability to reconstitute.
The “how” of the question is crucial. Hanno Pevkur, Estonian Defense Minister, said earlier this month if NATO wants to avoid a conflict with Russian forces it must help Ukraine win.
“If Russia is able to rebuild and restructure its defense capabilities and adapt their training and doctrine following a conflict in Ukraine, they will pose an even greater danger to NATO,” Davis warned.
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