Ukraine must make a crucial decision: intensify its air campaign in order to deny Russia victory, or adopt a punishment strategy that forces an end to the war.
In 2022, Russia launched long range strikes deep into Ukraine in the belief that Ukraine would not be able to retaliate. By 2023 this situation had changed. Ukraine received HIMARS medium-range rockets from America, Storm Shadow and SCALP Cruise Missiles from Britain and France, as well as developed its own long-range attack drones.
These rockets and missiles, combined in clever combinations, allowed Ukraine to attack Russian railways and roads, munitions stocks, maintenance facilities, warehouses and fuel depots. In turn, Russia finds it harder to sustain and support their front-line forces.
Even so, Russia still has some real advantages. The vast size of the country has allowed it to move logistic support further behind, making resupply at the front line slower but still possible. This geographic advantage allows Russia to protect its weapon factories, large arms stockpiles and air bases from regular attacks.
Also, Russia receives dual use supplies from China and foreign supporters. These materials, which are valuable for both civilians as well as the military, were less affected by sanctions. External sources can often offset Russian logistical losses.
The limited air strikes in Ukraine have caused some damage, but Russia’s industrial capacity has allowed it to repair most of that damage. These repairs are crude but they are effective. The repair of industrial infrastructure diverts resources from civilian needs and affects the Russian population. This burden has not yet led to a significant public opposition to war.
Ukraine’s air campaign is primarily focused on oil and munitions storage as well as air bases that are used by strike aircraft or bombers. These strikes are meant to deny Russia the ultimate victory. However, Ukraine’s attacks so far have been too few to achieve this.
Strategically, Russia seems determined to continue the war despite the cost in blood and treasure. A possible alternative strategy is to redirect Ukraine’s aerial campaign towards punishment. In Russian military terms this would be a “Strategic Operation for the Destruction of Critical Infrastructure”, designed to force the population to end the fighting by making everyday life unbearable.
These attacks are reminiscent old air power theories, which date back to the 1920s. They have questionable effectiveness and can violate laws of war.
Modern thinking favors focusing on the leadership of a country rather than its citizens. This approach, although a bit messy, worked during the 1999 Kosovo War. It is becoming more important, as it seems unlikely that Russia will win the war. Instead, Russian leaders need to be convinced that it is in their own best interest to end this war.
Both the 700-km Hrim-2 ballistic and 400-km Neptune-derived cruise missiles, which have warheads that are far more powerful than Ukraine’s current drones, will be put into service. These missiles, in combination with an increasing number long-range drones will allow for more frequent and damaging attacks. Ukraine must prioritize the targets with the greatest strategic impact.
By taking a systems-based approach, and deciding which level of warfare the attacks should be targeted at, the current approach of focusing on supply chains could be improved.
Ukraine could focus on the disruption of the resupply to Russian front-line troops, especially when they are under stress, as in the case of an offensive by Ukraine.
Ukraine could aim to shorten war by targeting the critical manufacturing hubs of Russia’s military. These hubs can be repaired or replaced.
The goal of the grand strategy would be to cripple the Russian economy by damaging key industries which are difficult to replace. This strategy could continue into the post-war era, reducing Russia’s power.
These new weapons may also prompt a rethinking about Ukraine’s air campaign. NATO’s success at Kosovo is a good example, as airstrikes were targeted at dual-use infrastructure. This caused widespread inconveniences, undermined morale and wore down the population. The simultaneous strikes against the property of the ruling elite weakened their “will for war”.
A similar campaign would be difficult to implement and would require diplomatic pressure, offensive cyber operations, and tightened sanction. The possibility of ending the war is appealing.
Ukraine will have to make a decision: either intensify its air campaign in order to deny Russia victory, or adopt a punishment strategy to force Russia to end the conflict. It will not be an easy choice.
Editor’s note: The opinions expressed by the authors in the op/ed section do not necessarily reflect those of the Kyiv Independent.
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