The ongoing war in Ukraine is firmly rooted in our vernacular. The word “sanction” is one of them. In response to Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine on 24 February, media, analytical, and government circles have been paying attention to several waves of sanctions imposed on Russia by the collective West. It is rare that a day goes by without the media, both domestic and foreign, discussing in detail the specifics of a certain package of sanctions.
We think the key question can be stated as follows: What is the impact of sanctions in deterring the aggressors, stopping military action and stimulating the process to end the war through negotiations?
It is important to note that despite the frequent use of the term, there has not yet been a consensus formed about the essence, effectiveness, and desired outcome of sanction not only in our own country but also overseas. The tone and scope are also diverse and contradictory, ranging from a mythologized view of sanctions to a discussion that highlights their practical ineffectiveness.
It would be incorrect to say that the practice is a “new scientific discipline” because it dates back 2,400 years to the Peloponnesian war. It is not accurate to use a mechanical calculation of years in order to draw valid conclusions. Conflict and war evolve over time. Each stage is distinct for its authenticity, whether it’s a degree or execution of international relationships or, for example, the technologies available to wage a war at that time. When discussing international relations at a global level, it’s also important to consider the temptation for a revisionist country to violate another country in a certain historical context and what tools it has to do so. On the other hand it’s important to determine if there is a political will to stop this infringement and if it has material resources to do so.
History has shown that the use of sanctions to decide the fate of war or peace is a flawed approach. There are many parallels, facts and observations that contradict each other. The war between Russia and Ukraine, the largest military conflict since the Second World War in Europe, has made it necessary to generalize these sanctions. This war has a number of aspects that are crucial. On one side, there is a plan for adjusting European security rules to the brutal force, and on the other, there is the need to thwart the plan, along with the necessity to remodel the European Order to adequately handle modern challenges.
In a process of this gravity, the phenomenon of sanctions, their role and purpose, as well as other measures of containment require constant observation, understanding and revision of conclusions. This article aims to share with readers some observations or viewpoints. In order to achieve this, we will refer first to the so-called “sanctions theory” and remind several aspects. We believe that if we did not include these aspects, the discussion about the effectiveness of Western Sanctions in preventing Russian aggression in Ukraine will be incomplete and one-sided.
The real (non-celebratory side) of theorization
A financial sanction is a “stop” in between failed diplomatic efforts and armed interventions to solve a particular problem. By imposing sanctions, the initiator, or group of initiators, admits that political efforts have failed in large measure. However, this does not mean they have the desire, intention, and willingness to resort to military means to correct the situation.
We must remember that the history of modern sanctions is not characterized by continuity and consistency. In the period between the first world war and the second, sanctions were used to deter war at different frequencies and often with little success. The essence of sanctions was different from what we understand today, and mainly involved an economic blockade. This economic blockade, which primarily restricted international trade, was seen as the best tool to punish the aggressor or the accused. Or, in modern military terms, it was the “nuclear” weapon of the time. Despite being used, this tool failed to achieve the universal goal of deterring military intervention and saving mankind from the devastating Second World War.
In the 1980s, a more robust policy of sanctions was adopted and implemented around the world.
In terms of realistic expectations for “miraculous” sanctions results, a general observation is that the impact is “mixed”, and not always strong and obvious. According to the success of the goals set, only a third of the various measures taken in the past decade to sanction and punish were fully effective. The use of sanctions in place of armed forces can help civil and political leaders to better manage crises, in a less explosive environment. Sanctions are less dangerous than military action, both physically and politically.
What are the necessary theoretical nuances to make a set of sanctions more targeted, tailored to a particular situation, and more likely to achieve the desired results?
Understanding the goal
It is one thing to timely and correctly assess a breach of norms of international law and behavior, condemn it, and call on the violator to rectify it, though it is still political-declarative evaluation of the breach. It is much more difficult to come up with effective countermeasures, including economic “lethal” weapons, in addition to condemnation and assessment.
We intentionally mentioned “economic lethality” or the deadly effect of economic sanctions, because the general purpose of any sanction, in a nominally peaceful environment, is to undermine a nation‘s economic and socio-economic resources.
The reality and practice show that, despite a purpose that is fairly clearly defined, it is extremely difficult to tailor sanctions to a specific situation. This, in fact, is not surprising considering the political-economic-military overlapping of different actors in the modern world.
In any case, it is important that the person who initiates sanctions understands exactly what the punishment measures are for. What is the expected result of these measures? In order to respond with a sanctions-oriented approach, it is important that the answers to these questions are clear from the beginning. This is because ambiguity and redefining the goals and objectives after sanctions have been imposed will harm the reputation of those who initiated them and undermine their effectiveness.
Sanctions will likely be more effective if the target country is more open than if it is authoritarian: the more the regime controls public opinion and the perception of events, the more likely society will rally around the regime.
One common opinion is that imposing sanctions is done to inflict pain on a country’s target so that it will not take a short-term action, or pursue a long-term strategy. It is important to understand the goals and objectives of sanctions from the beginning. However, it is equally important to monitor their management in a fair and impartial manner. In other words, the management of sanctions is equally important to the process.
A few key aspects are essential to the process of good management.
The first is to ensure that the most effective sanctions are imposed by forming the largest possible coalition around a political decision. If sanctions are not implemented, the target will find loopholes in order to continue their harmful political-military actions, which will, over time reduce the effectiveness of sanctions almost to zero. When discussing coalition unity, one must also consider that different participants in the package, especially if there are many, can have different attitudes and motivations. The effectiveness of large-scale sanction depends not only on participants’ numbers, but also their identities.
Another factor to consider is the perception of the target country’s population and their attitude towards the sanctions that are expected. This is also a topic that requires few comments. First, sanctions will likely be more effective in an open country than in a country with a strong authoritarian regime. The more the authoritative regime controls public opinion and the perception of events, the more likely the society is to rally behind it. The choice of target is therefore of great importance.
A constant evaluation of the implementation of sanctions with the goal of adding or modifying existing measures is another aspect of the management of sanctions. The belief that the effectiveness and quantity of sanctions depend on their severity is also incorrect.
The word “management” does not only have a semantic meaning, but also carries a functional connotation. The management must be continuously monitored and assessed, because with a complex approach, the “pain”, inflicted by the sanctions, will not be less or more severe than the political decision intended.
In relation to the management process, it is important to note that, in order to achieve the goals and objectives set, it is necessary for the escalation-de-escalation actions determined in the sanction policy to be matched appropriately. This allows communication with the targeted country and its government using a carrot-andstick approach. This flexibility is necessary for a targeted use of sanctions.
Recent practice shows legal problems in management. The regulators and courts, for example, do not have a clear position on secondary sanctions or individuals sanctioned who act under “corporate guise”, etc. This is a very specific matter and goes beyond the scope in this article.
We must also understand the gradual withdrawal of sanctions in parallel with the imposition of sanctions. Any speed, delay or spontaneity will damage the effectiveness of this economic weapon.
Nevertheless, it is important to note the topic of “smart” sanctioning, particularly in relation to management demands. The main point is that initiators of sanctions should avoid unexpected outcomes (for example, a disaster on a humanitarian scale, or damage to the economy of a partner country) and select a package of sanctioning actions that is appropriate to their goals and objectives. We should also add that, in parallel with the decision of imposing sanctions, it is important to have a proper understanding of the gradual exit from sanctions. Speed or delay, as well as spontaneity, will harm the functionality of the economic weapon.
In order to implement modern sanctions, it is important to have a practical understanding, a depoliticized assessment and a technocratic assessment. The effectiveness of an “economic war” would be questioned if the word “sanctions” was used, as it does not necessarily mean success.
Read Part II.
Analysis by Victor Kipiani Chairman of Geocase
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