Serhii Kuza, a political and military expert, is the Chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center. He previously served as advisor to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (2012-2023) and advisor to Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (2014). Radio Free Europe/RL’s Georgian Service sat him down to discuss hopes for Ukraine, as winter approaches, and hopes for Georgia, as elections loom. We began our discussion by discussing the loss of Vuhledar.
Vuhledar is no longer standing after more than 2 years. What will be the impact?
We must understand that Vuhledar, and its surroundings, were very important to the Russians but not so much for Ukraine. Vuhledar, which was the focal point of our intervention in their logistics, connected the eastern regions of Donetsk to the southern region. In the south the railway system was quite poor and undeveloped. Railways are the backbone for Russian logistics. Whereas Western logistics relies on motor transport, Russian logistic relies on railways. In the east – Donetsk Luhansk etc. – the railway network has been well developed. In the south the Russians are building new infrastructure. They needed a railway to connect Donetsk with Volnovakha, and then on to Mariupol as they couldn’t use the existing railway. Now that they have taken Vuhledar they will develop and fine-tune infrastructure that runs along Sea of Azov. This will make it easier for them to move their forces and equipment not only to the south but even to Crimea. They will also be out of range of our artillery. They have defended themselves.
We were unable to maintain control in Ukraine because we had to stretch our logistical capabilities. It was a disadvantage to us. The location was a strategic advantage for us, but the plains all around made it difficult to defend. We are now leveling the front. We are closing the distance and moving closer to our main fortifications in the west. This smaller front line is more convenient and advantageous for us.
You defended Vuhledar for months. Why did you not retreat sooner if it was in your favor?
Avdiivka can be asked the same question. Avdiivka has been surrounded by three sides for more than a year. This is a near-complete encirclement. We were able, with sufficient ammunition, to hold the dominant height, control the adjacent area, control not only the city, but also its surrounding area, and fire on Russian logistic lines, the railroad and highways. We ran into ammunition problems when the Senate spent 7 months trying to agree on a package of aid for Ukraine. We had to leave Avdiivka. Vuhledar’s situation is similar. It had ceased to exist in principle as a city last year. That is, it was completely re-equipped into a fortress. Vuhledar was only able to function as a defensive outpost as long it could destroy enemy forces at this height and as long the fortifications enabled us to defend. The ratio of Russian to Ukrainian losses was high enough for us to decide to continue to defend it until it became untenable.
If the West had delivered on your military aid requests in time, would Vuhledar have fallen too?
Indeed. Our Western partners only meet 20% to 30% our requests. We have serious issues with ammunition, equipment, and weapons. We admit that we are behind the Russians in terms of equipment, weapons and ammunition. This is our problem. It would appear that despite the fact that they have emptied most of their artillery, they still outnumber us by 6-8 times in terms of intensity. This is a serious issue. Unfortunately, this problem is far from being resolved.
We can deal with their artillery and go toe-to-toe. We destroy their artillery systems, their armored vehicles and their tanks. But we have a real problem with aviation. We can’t change it. If you look at the Russian footage, they dropped large aircraft bombs from the South, from the East, and they destroyed our positions. It is difficult to hold positions when they bombard us every day with air raids. We can’t raise our heads.
Russia continues its meat grinder tactic. What is more likely if neither side is willing to back down? That Russia will run short of soldiers or that Ukraine will be left with no cities?
If we look at the numbers, we can see that the Russians’ area of occupation in the summer offensive is smaller than the area that we occupied in the aftermath of the Kursk Operation.
In Kursk, unlike Ukrainian cities, nobody defended Russian territory.
This is because they don’t have reserves. If we look at the losses they suffered last month, we can see that they lost 40,000 soldiers. This means that we destroy or take out of battle over a 1,000 of their fighters per day. The usual numbers are 1300-1400. At that rate, any army will be depleted.
Add to this the fact that the Russians failed to achieve any of their objectives for their summer offensive. In the spring we talked about these incredible Russian reserves and how we expected them to overwhelm us, charge us, and break through during the summer. After Avdiivka they planned to take Pokrovsk, and then head towards Zaporizhzhya, and Dnipro to reach the administrative border of the Donetsk Region. They also planned to take Chasiv-Yyar to approach and decimate Sloviansk and the urban agglomeration that includes Kramatorsk and Kostyantynivka. If we look higher up, in the north, the plan was to take Kupiansk on the left bank of Oskil River.
During the summer offensive campaign, none of these tasks were completed. They did not. They had planned to take Chasiv-Yar in June, at the start of summer. They didn’t take it. They couldn’t even reach the left bank on the Oskil, and they were unable to approach Kupyansk. We expected to see fighting around Kupyansk. But they didn’t make it. They haven’t taken the entire Luhansk area. They haven’t even approached Pokrovsk. They have not taken Kurakhov to the south.
We can see that the Russians’ reserves are being depleted. If we want to maintain the same intensity in the fight, then it will also depend on our reserves. But the Russians must mobilize additional people.
Western media claim that there are major problems with the Ukrainian reserve forces – those who are motivated to defend their homeland have already been at the front and the rest of the reserves are being forced through by force.
This is a common problem for a conflict of this size and intensity. We need to understand that in 2022, we ran out of volunteers. All the volunteers who wanted the front line went in ’22. In 2023 there was not a big wave of volunteers, and in 2024 even less. We had to mobilize. The people receive their summons and then go to enlist. Since May, we have carried out a monthly planned mobilization. Those who were mobilized between June and July are now finishing their training in September and Octember and will be heading to the front.
We know what we’re going into the winter with and we’re confident that we won’t be left without fighters.
We have a big problem with equipping all of them. This is a question that we have already asked our industry and partners. We will fight all winter long, there is no doubt about that. We will continue and we will have enough men.
What do you make of Georgian Dream’s latest election posters comparing Ukraine to Georgia, claiming that they are the only ones who can offer peace to Georgia?
The fact that the ruling party uses Russian narratives and manipulates them is alarming. Since 2016, we’ve heard similar narratives in Ukraine. Viktor Medvedchuk was our rich guy and “agent of Russian interest” who also spoke about the need for peace at all costs. They tried to plant these seeds in the body of Ukraine – the occupied regions Donetsk & Luhansk – under the indirect control Moscow, just to avoid a war. Such speculations are in the interests of Russia. Russia wants to undermine statehood in its neighbors. It has done so in Moldova with Transnistria and in Ukraine with Donetsk & Luhansk. It is also trying to undermine the statehood of Georgia by using the occupied territories Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia as bait. This is what weakens a state because it gives Russia leverage.
I am certain that in Georgia, they will follow the same situation as in Ukraine. They will offer to return Abkhazia or South Ossetia but only under the conditions of a confederation, a limitation of the sovereignty of the state, and so on. These are typical Russian conditions and tricks of the KGB. Those who act in Moscow’s interests, whether consciously or not, are doing so at the behest of Moscow. Medvedchuk’s story did not end well. All Russian agents will end like Medvedchuk or worse.
We are absolutely certain that you cannot defeat Russia only here in Donbas. They must also be expelled from Transnistria and South Ossetia. Both Georgia and Moldova need to have full sovereignty. Then and only then can we discuss the security of our entire region.
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